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[1] During solar cycle 22, a very intense geomagnetic storm on 13 March 1989 contributed to the
collapse of the Hydro-Quebec power system in Canada. This event clearly demonstrated that
geomagnetic storms have the potential to lead to blackouts. This paper addresses whether geomagnetic
activity challenged power system reliability during solar cycle 23. Operations by PJM Interconnection,
LLC (hereafter PJM), a regional transmission organization in North America, are examined over the
period 1 April 2002 through 30 April 2004. During this time PJM coordinated the movement of wholesale
electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West
Virginia, and the District of Columbia in the United States. We examine the relationship between a
proxy of geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) and a metric of challenged reliability. In this study,
GICs are proxied using magnetometer data from a geomagnetic observatory located just outside the PJM
control area. The metric of challenged reliability is the incidence of out-of-economic-merit order
dispatching due to adverse reactive power conditions. The statistical methods employed make it
possible to disentangle the effects of GICs on power system operations from purely terrestrial factors.
The results of the analysis indicate that geomagnetic activity can significantly increase the likelihood
that the system operator will dispatch generating units based on system stability considerations rather
than economic merit.
Citation: Forbes, K. F., and O. C. St. Cyr (2012), Did geomagnetic activity challenge electric power reliability
during solar cycle 23? Evidence from the PJM regional transmission organization in North America, Space Weather,
10, S05001, doi:10.1029/2011SW000752.
1. Introduction
[2] During solar cycle 22, a very intense geomagnetic
storm on 13 March 1989 led to the collapse of the Hydro-
Quebec power system in Canada. This event clearly dem-
onstrated that geomagnetic storms have the potential to
lead to blackouts. This vulnerability exists because geo-
magnetically induced currents (GICs) can sharply degrade
the performance of critical transmission infrastructure.
[3] No major blackouts were attributed to geomagnetic
activity during solar cycle 23. However, this may under-
state the reliability challenge if system operators were able
to avoid blackouts by undertaking actions that had non-
trivial costs. The number of blackouts over a solar cycle
may also be an unreliable metric of the potential reliability
challenge if the vulnerability of the power grid is contin-
gent on system conditions and the number of large geo-
magnetic storms is small.
[4] Indicative of space weather’s perceived threat to the
reliability of the electric power system, the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has advised the
electric power industry to monitor the power system for
geomagnetic effects when the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA) Space Weather Prediction
Center (SWPC) issues a K-index warning of Kp of 6 or
higher [Rollison et al., 2011]. The SWPC website indicates
that this is approximately equivalent to amaximum change
in the horizontal component of the geomagnetic field that
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equals or exceeds 120 nT/min (http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/
info/Kindex.html). At the Kp = 6 level of geomagnetic
activity, system operators are advised to increase reserves of
reactive power, decrease loading on susceptible equipment,
and consider increasing import capacity (see “Background
for alert: Preparing for geo-magnetic disturbances,” 2011,
http://www.nerc.com/docs/pc/gmdtf/GMD_Background_
Draft_05062011_CLEAN.pdf). More extensive measures
are advised when more severe geomagnetic conditions
are expected.
[5] This paper addresses whether geomagnetic activity
was actually a challenge to power system reliability during
solar cycle 23. Do the data support NERC’s advisory or
does the link between space weather and the power grid
become an issue only when the magnitude of the geo-
magnetic storm reaches or exceeds that of March 1989?
[6] The paper uses data from the PJM regional trans-
mission organization (RTO) in the mid-Atlantic region of
the United States to examine the relationship between
geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) and challenged
power system reliability. This research follows Forbes
and St. Cyr [2008], who presented evidence that various
metrics of power grid operations in 12 geographically
disparate electricity grids were statistically related with
a proxy for GICs. More recently, Forbes and St. Cyr
[2010] have presented multivariate statistical evidence
that GICs contribute to constraints in PJM’s 500 kilovolt
(kV) transmission system.
[7] The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses reactive power, a form of power that is
critical to the stability of the transmission system. It also
discusses “reactive off-cost” operations, which are a set of
procedures PJM implements when there are inadequate
levels of reactive power. The incidence of these events is
the metric of challenged reliability considered in this paper.
Section 3 discusses the data employed in the study. Section 4
presents a chi-square analysis of the GIC proxy and the
incidence of reactive off-cost events in the PJM transmis-
sion system. Section 5 presents a multivariate model of
reactive off-cost events that takes into account possible
confounding factors. Section 6 reports the estimation
results and also offers evidence that the reactive power
vulnerability of the transmission system is not constant
over time but instead varies with power system conditions.
Section 7 summarizes the findings and discusses research
that could mitigate the overall reliability challenge by
forecasting the vulnerability of the transmission system.
2. Reactive Power and the Reliability
of the Power Grid
[8] PJM Interconnection coordinated the dispatch of
76,000 megawatts (MW) of generating capacity over
approximately 32,000 km of transmission lines in all or parts
of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia as
of 30 April 2004. The sample period for this analysis is
1 April 2002 through 30 April 2004. During this period,
PJM operated both real-time and day-ahead markets for
energy. Prices in both markets are location-based, which
means the prices will be equal across locations when the
transmission system is uncongested but can vary substan-
tially from one location to another when there are trans-
mission constraints. For example, transmission constraints
can lead to significant differences in the real-time price at
PJM’s Eastern Hub compared to its Western Hub.
[9] A substantial portion of PJM’s generating capacity is
accounted for by coal-fired power plants in the western
part of the control area while demand centers are in the
east. Exclusive of the environmental damage associated
with coal-fired generation, the generating costs of pro-
ducing electricity from coal are relatively low. Thus, market
forces favor the dispatch of coal-fired electricity and the
associated large transfers of electricity from the western
portion of the control area to the eastern demand centers.
For example, over the sample period, the average transfers
of electricity at PJM’s western interface were approxi-
mately 4800 megawatt hours (MWh) while the transfer
limits, the values beyond which reactive and voltage cri-
teria are violated, averaged approximately 5800 MWh.
The averages of the transfers and the transfer limits at
PJM’s eastern interface were approximately 5000 and
6000 MWh, respectively. To put these values in perspec-
tive, based on data downloaded from the European Net-
work of Transmission System Operators for Electricity
(http://www.entsoe.net/home.aspx), the 2010 net transfer
capacity of the transmission lines between France and
Germany was approximately 2800 MWh for exports from
France to Germany and 2850 for exports from Germany to
France.
[10] High-voltage electricity transmission systems almost
exclusively employ alternating current technology, with
notable exceptions such as the interconnector between
England and France, the cable that links the North and
South Islands of New Zealand, and the Cross Sound cable
project that links Long Island with Connecticut. For
example, as of 31 December 2004, approximately 254,397
of the 258,634 km of high-voltage transmission lines
(230 kV and above) in the United States were accounted for
by alternating current technology [North American Electric
Reliability Corporation, 2005]. In an alternating current sys-
tem, voltage and current oscillate up and down 50 times per
second in most of the world (60 times per second in North
America). As a result, the power transmitted on single
transmission line also pulsates up and down around
the average value [Sauer, 2003]. This average value is a
measure of “real” power. Another form of power known
as reactive power is also supplied or consumed depend-
ing on whether current peaks before or after voltage
[U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 2005].
Reactive power maintains the voltages required for system
stability and thus is critical to the delivery of real power to
consumers. Sources of reactive power include generators
and capacitors. Reactive power is consumed by
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transmission lines, transformers, and motors. Excessive
reactive power consumption has the potential to lead to
voltage collapse and system instability. A key attribute
of reactive power is that its consumption can increase
significantly with the distance transported [FERC, 2005].
This attribute is critical to the modeling of reactive power
deficiencies.
[11] According to FERC [2005], voltage collapse due to
inadequate reactive power has contributed to a number of
blackouts. Among those cited by FERC were blackouts on
2 July 1996 and 10 August 1996 on the West Coast of the
United States; 19 December 1978 in France; 23 July
1987 in Tokyo, Japan; 28 August 2003 in London,
England; 23 September 2003 in Sweden and Denmark;
and 28 September 2003 in Italy. FERC even notes that
voltage collapse due to inadequate reactive power was a
contributing factor to the blackout experienced by Hydro-
Quebec on 13 March 1989.
[12] The U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force
investigated the causes of the 14 August 2003 blackout in
the Northeast United States and Canada. The task force
concluded that inadequate management of reactive power
was a contributing factor in the blackout [U.S.-Canada
Power System Outage Task Force, 2004, p. 18]:
The Ohio phase of the August 14, 2003, blackout was caused
by deficiencies in specific practices, equipment, and human
decisions by various organizations that affected conditions and
outcomes that afternoon—for example, insufficient reactive
power was an issue in the blackout, but it was not a cause in itself.
Rather, deficiencies in corporate policies, lack of adherence to
industry policies, and inadequate management of reactive power
and voltage caused the blackout, rather than the lack of reactive
power.
[13] A 23 September 2003 article in the New York Times
by Richard Pérez-Peña and Eric Lipton is somewhat more
illuminating on the role of reactive power in the 14 August
2003 blackout [Pérez-Peña and Lipton, 2003, paragraph 5]:
Experts now think that on Aug. 14, northern Ohio had a severe
shortage of reactive power, which ultimately caused the power
plant and transmission line failures that set the blackout in
motion. Demand for reactive power was unusually high because
of a large volume of long-distance transmissions streaming
through Ohio to areas, including Canada, than needed to import
power to meet local demand. But the supply of reactive power
was low because some plants were out of service and, possibly,
because other plants were not producing enough of it.
[14] PJM experienced significant reactive power/low
voltage challenges in 1999. For example, very low voltages
were recorded on the transmission system during a heat
wave in July 1999 and all emergency procedures except for
“manual load dump” were implemented [PJM, 2000, p. 4].
Voltages were low because the consumption of reactive
power exceeded the supply [PJM, 2000]. One possible fac-
tor contributing to this imbalance was a lack of incentive
for generators to produce reactive power since its pro-
duction can reduce the quantity of real power that can be
sold (see “Interim report of the U.S. Department of
Energy’s power outage study team,” 2000, http://certs.lbl.
gov/pdf/post-interim.pdf). A root-cause analysis gave rise
to 20 recommendations. The first recommendation was
the development of a comprehensive voltage operating
criteria, with one stipulation that the criteria “should
define limits associated with non-cost actions, off-cost
actions, and load dump” [PJM, 2000, p. 11].
[15] With a number of important lessons learned from
the July 1999 event and a new energy management system
in place, PJM considers adherence to the reactive transfer
limits at the internal interfaces within PJM (e.g., the
eastern interface) to be critical to the reliability of its
system. Its training materials note that “Small increase in
flow or load can cause large voltage fluctuation” [PJM,
2008, p. 168] and that voltage collapse has potential to
lead to a blackout of the system. In short, PJM reports
that the “Reactive Transfer Limits are the most critical
system reliability limits” because they represent the
“largest potential system impact if exceeded” [PJM, 2008,
p. 168]. It is therefore not surprising that an automated
security analysis evaluates the transfer limits approxi-
mately every 5 min and that “PJM dispatchers continu-
ously monitor and control the flow on each transfer
interface so that the flows remain at or below the transfer
limits” [PJM, 2011a, p. 45]. Those readers interested in
learning more about PJM’s views on reactive power are
encouraged to read its reactive power factsheet [PJM,
2012a].
[16] PJM normally dispatches generators based on their
cost, with the lowest cost generators being dispatched
first. One major exception to this “economic merit,” or
“on-cost,” method of dispatch is when generation is
dispatched “out of economic merit order,” or “off-cost,”
due to a transmission constraint [PJM, 2008, p. 8]. Adverse
reactive power conditions can warrant a reduction in the
transfer limits and thus can give rise to these events. PJM
distinguishes this as a “reactive off-cost” operation, during
which generators are redispatched so that the transmission
flows at the internal interfaces remain at or below the
reactive transfer limits.
[17] Given that the cost of generation is a lower priority
during a reactive off-cost operation, it is reasonable to
suppose that these events would have a market impact.
Consistent with this view, the average real-time price at
PJM’s Eastern Hub over the sample period was about
$0.70 per MWh higher than at its Western Hub when the
transmission system was in reactive on-cost status. When
reactive off-cost operations were in effect, the average
real-time price at the Eastern Hub was approximately
$11.36 per MWh higher than at the Western Hub. This
represents an approximately 20% premium above the
average day-ahead price at PJM’s Eastern Hub for those
same market periods. This is obviously a significant
market impact. However, the apparent market impact is
surely modest relative to the costs imposed on consumers
should a reactive off-cost operation not be declared and
the system collapses as a result.
FORBES AND ST. CYR: CHALLENGES TO ELECTRIC POWER RELIABILITY S05001S05001
3 of 14
[18] With respect to space weather, Kappenman [2003]
has pointed out that there is an increase in reactive power
consumption when GICs pass through a transformer. In
his words [Kappenman, 2003, p. 4]:
Though these quasi-DC currents are small compared to the nor-
mal AC current flows in the network, they have very large
impacts upon the operation of transformers in the network….
The principal concern to network reliability is due to increased
reactive power demands from transformers that can cause
voltage regulation problems, a situation that can rapidly escalate
into a grid-wide voltage collapse.
[19] Consistent with this emphasis on GICs, reactive
power consumption, and the challenge to system stability,
Kappenman [2010, Figures 2–7] has presented evidence
that GICs increased reactive power consumption in
Hydro-Quebec on 13 March 1989 by a factor of approxi-
mately 8 over the course of approximately 6 min. Power
consumption increased from approximately 200 megavolt
ampere reactive (MVAR) to about 1600 MVAR just
minutes prior to the “tripping” of the five 735 kV tie
lines needed to ensure electricity transfers to Montreal
from the remote hydro generation facilities at James Bay
[Kappenman, 2010]. Hydro-Quebec was unable to make
up the loss in transmission, and the system collapsed.
In summary, the Hydro-Quebec system collapsed on
13 March 1989 because of GIC-induced consumption
of reactive power.
[20] Other researchers also have noted the impact of
GICs on reactive power demands. For example, Molinski
[2002] cites evidence of a linear relationship between GIC
levels and the reactive power consumption by high-voltage
transformers. According to Molinski, this relationship is
evident even at low GIC levels [Molinski, 2002, Figure 9].
[21] PJM recognizes the challenge to reliability posed by
space weather. In its words, “Geomagnetically-induced
currents (GIC) caused by the solar magnetic disturbance
(SMD) flow through the power system equipment and
facilities may result in major increases in system reactive
requirements, equipment damage, and disruption of
interconnected system operation.” [PJM, 2012c, p. 46]. To
avoid these effects, PJM invokes its SMD conservative
operations procedures. These operations are put into effect
based on ground current readings by PJM. During these
events, operators curtail transmission and generators are
dispatched on the basis of system stability considerations,
not economics. According to PJM’s emergency operations
manual, “Upon identification of a geomagnetic distur-
bance, PJM dispatcher operates the system to geomagnetic
disturbance transfer limits” [PJM, 2012c, p. 46]. PJM
makes it clear that the imposition of these limits has
implications for power generation [PJM, 2012c, p. 47]:
When the GIC limit is approached or exceeded, generation
redispatch assignments are made in the most effective areas to
control this limit. PJM dispatcher also evaluates the impact of
the existing inter-area transfers and modifies the schedules that
adversely affect the GIC transfer limit.
PJM details its views on solar magnetic disturbances, i.e.,
space weather, in its solar magnetic disturbances factsheet
[PJM, 2012b].
[22] PJM declared its SMD procedures during the
Bastille Day storm in July 2000. Specifically, the pro-
cedures were implemented over the time period 15:30–
21:07 LT on 15 July 2000. Interestingly, PJM’s raw data
files (available at http://pjm.com/markets-and-operations/
ops-analysis/offcostop.aspx) refer to this event as “reactive
(SMD)” in nature. Both the transfer limits and flows were
curtailed during this event. Problematically in terms of
system reliability, the average transfers at PJM’s eastern
interface exceeded the limit during 1 h.
[23] PJM replaced its emergency reporting system since
2000 with the result being that the current system does not
reflect the July 2000 SMD event. However, the current
reporting system does reveal that conservative operations
in response to solar magnetic disturbances were declared
on four occasions over the sample period corresponding to
this study (http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/
etools/emerg-procedure.aspx). All of these instances
occurred in October and November 2003. These actions
are consistent with the NOAA SWPC assessment of the
October–November 2003 storms (http://www.nws.noaa.
gov/os/assessments/pdfs/SWstorms_assessment.pdf).
[24] There was an abnormally high incidence of reactive
off-cost operations in PJM during the Halloween storms of
2003. Specifically, from 29 to 31 October 2003, reactive off-
cost operations were implemented in 18 of the 72 h, a rate
more than twice the average rate of incidence. Some
coincided with PJM’s implementation of its SMD conser-
vative operations but others did not. During these same
storms the Swedish high-voltage power transmission
system also experienced problems [Pulkkinen et al., 2005].
Forbes and St. Cyr [2008] also noted a series of emergency
deployments of balancing power in the Netherlands
power grid during these same storms and presented
evidence that the incidence of the emergency deploy-
ments is statistically related to the value of a GIC proxy.
Specifically, based on 3 years of quarterly hour data, they
report a p-value of 3.082  1014 (a value corresponding to
the odds of flipping a fair coin approximately 45 times and
observing a “heads” each time). The null hypothesis of no
relationship was therefore rejected.
3. Data
[25] A number of factors can give rise to off-cost opera-
tions. For example, PJM has indicated that an off-cost
operation is the most common response to violations of
the thermal transmission limits [PJM, 2008]. This study
focuses exclusively on reactive off-cost operations. The
time periods in which off-cost operations were imple-
mented are posted on the PJM website (http://pjm.com/
markets-and-operations/ops-analysis/offcostop.aspx). The
raw data indicate whether the root cause of an off-cost
operation was “reactive” in nature. As discussed in the
previous section, PJM is able to identify the root cause
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because it monitors reactive conditions at several inter-
faces within its system [PJM, 2011a]. On the basis of these
readings, all or a portion of the system is operated reactive
on-cost or off-cost. The raw data representing reactive off-
cost events were downloaded and a binary variable was
created with 1 representing the outcome when all or a
portion of the system was operated reactive off-cost for all
or part of an hour and zero otherwise.
[26] Following Forbes and St. Cyr [2010], we dropped
observations from the sample if geomagnetic data were
missing, data on forecasted load were missing for any hour
of the day, or if ambient temperature data were missing.
The sample also excludes transition days between stan-
dard and daylight saving time. The hours corresponding
to the August 2003 Northeast blackout were also excluded
from the analysis. In total, 2,001 deletions left a sample
of 16,262 observations to be analyzed. Over the sample
period, one or more reactive off-cost operations were in
effect during 1727 h, about 10% of the sample. In 476 of
these periods, PJM also experienced constraints in its
500 kV transformers, the incidence of which has been
analyzed by Forbes and St. Cyr [2010].
[27] Data on hourly load and the locational prices by
hour were downloaded directly from the PJM web site.
The day-ahead hourly forecasted load data was obtained
from the Itron Corporation (www.itron.com). The hourly
ambient temperature data were obtained from the National
Weather Service for the Baltimore-Washington, Pittsburgh,
and Philadelphia airports. Data from these airports yielded
significantly fewer missing values compared to the
alternatives.
[28] The econometric results reported in section 6 make
use of day-ahead electricity price data weighted by the
prices of coal and natural gas, the primary fossil fuels used
by generators in PJM. These variables are included because
they reflect expected operating conditions. Specifically,
they proxy the opportunity costs of generators of providing
reactive power. Economic dispatch in PJM is based on
offers to provide generation, which, in turn, are based on
marginal costs. In the absence of transmission constraints,
the offers are accepted beginning with the lowest-priced
offers. Higher-priced offers are then accepted until the
total amount of generation offered equals the anticipated
demand for electricity. The day-ahead price is determined
by the expected operating characteristics of the last gen-
erating unit that is dispatched. The day-ahead price of
electricity relative to the price of the fuels used to gen-
erate the electricity therefore reflects expected operating
conditions as well as the opportunity cost of providing
reactive power. We obtained natural gas price data from
NGI Intelligence Press (http://intelligencepress.com); we
obtained coal price data from Platts (http://www.platts.
com). We transformed prices into U.S. dollars per GJ. The
median values of the ratios are approximately 6.6 and
25.2 for natural gas and coal, respectively. When adverse
operating conditions are expected, the price ratio for
natural gas can exceed 50, while the ratio for coal can
exceed 150.
[29] PJM has significant nuclear generation capacity and
thus some may wonder why the price ratios discussed
above do not include nuclear generation. The economic
reality is that nuclear power generating units have very
low marginal costs and a nuclear plant is highly unlikely
to be the marginal generating unit. Consistent with this
view, the 2006 PJM State of the market report [PJM, 2007]
indicated that nuclear was never the marginal fuel during
the period 2004–2006 (data before 2004 are unavailable).
In contrast, coal and natural gas were the marginal fuels
in more than 90% of the operating periods.
[30] Previous literature has indicated that GIC levels in
power grids are closely related to the time derivative of
the horizontal component of the geomagnetic field [Bolduc
et al., 1998; Coles et al., 1992; Mäkinen, 1993; Viljanen, 1998;
Viljanen et al., 2001]. Accordingly, GICs in this study are
proxied by the time derivative of the horizontal compo-
nent (dH/dt) of the geomagnetic field.
[31] For each 1-h market period, the rate of the change
in the horizontal component of the geomagnetic field
(dH/dt) was calculated using the largest change (in absolute
value) in the 1-min values of horizontal component of the
geomagnetic field over the hour in question.
[32] The raw data were downloaded from the Inter-
magnet website (http://www.intermagnet.org). Specifically,
the study uses data reported by the U.S. Geological
Survey’s geomagnetic observatory in Fredericksburg (FRD),
Virginia, which is located about 75 km south of the
boundaries of the PJM control area during the study
period. The peak value of dH/dt over the sample period
was 178.4 nT/min. Based on 1-min FRD data downloaded
from the World Data Centre for Geomagnetism, Edinburgh
(http://www.wdc.bgs.ac.uk/catalog/master.html), this peak
value was significantly lower than the peak of 353 nT/min
that was obtained for FRD during the 13 March 1989 geo-
magnetic storm that crashed the Hydro-Quebec power
system.
4. Preliminary Analysis Using a Nonparametric
Test Statistic
[33] Following Forbes and St. Cyr [2008, 2010], this study
initially tests the hypothesis that GIC levels and the
incidence of reactive off-cost events are related using
Pearson’s chi-square statistic, a nonparametric test statistic
that makes no assumption about the distribution of the
frequencies. In contrast to simple correlation analysis, it
does not presume that the relationship is linear.
[34] Following Sheskin [2007], we proceed by first estab-
lishing a number of mutually exclusive categories for the
GIC proxy. The GIC proxy data were categorized by
quartile where GIC1, GIC2, GIC4, and GIC4 represent
the first through the fourth quartiles, respectively. With
respect to grid conditions, we will consider two categories:
reactive off-cost (Off-Cost) and reactive on-cost (On-Cost).
[35] The chi-square analysis proceeds by constructing a
cross-tabulation between the measure of grid conditions
and the GIC proxy and reporting on the observed
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frequency in each cell (Table 1). This observed frequency
is then compared to the frequency that would be expected
if the two variables were statistically independent
(Table 2). The procedure for calculating these values is
presented in Forbes and St. Cyr [2010]. Table 3 presents the
ratio of observed to expected frequencies. Consistent with
the hypothesis that there is a causal relationship between
GIC levels and the incidence of reactive off-cost opera-
tions, the reader should observe that the ratio corre-
sponding to off-cost (on-cost) monotonically increases
(declines) as the GIC category increases (decreases). For
example, the observed ratio associated with GIC1 ∩ off-
cost is about 32% lower than expected while the observed
ratio associated with GIC4 ∩ off-cost is about 30% higher
than what would be expected under the null hypothesis
of statistical independence.
[36] The chi-square test can be used to assess whether
the reported differences between the observed and expec-
ted frequencies are statistically significant. The chi-square
test statistic is calculated as follows:
c ¼
XR
i¼1
XC
j¼1
f oi; j  f ei; j
 2
f ei; j
; ð1Þ
where fi,j
o represents the observed frequency, fi,j
e represents
the expected frequency under the assumption that the
null hypothesis is true, R is the number of row categories,
and C is the number of column categories.
[37] The null hypothesis of statistical independence is
rejected if the calculated chi-square statistic exceeds (c2)*,
the critical value of the statistic corresponding to the level
of statistical significance. The exact value of (c2)* will
depend on the number of degrees of freedom that will
equal the number of row categories minus one multiplied
by the number of column categories. In this case there are
four GIC categories and two power grid categories; thus
there are three degrees of freedom. The corresponding
critical value of the chi-square statistic at the 1% level of
statistical significance equals 11.345. In this case, the cal-
culated chi-square statistic equals 103.994, which exceeds
the critical value of the statistic by a substantial margin.
The associated p-value equals 2.151E-22. This value is
approximately equal to the probability of flipping a fair
coin 72 times and observing a “head” on each flip. Most
individuals who flip a coin that is claimed to be “fair”
72 times and observe a “head” each and every time would
most likely conclude that the coin is not fair. In any event,
the p-value in this case is well below 0.01 and thus the
null hypothesis of statistical independence between the
GIC proxy and the incidence of reactive off-cost events is
rejected at the 1% level of statistical significance. This
finding does not “prove” that GICs contribute to the
implementation of reactive off-cost events, but it is never-
theless consistent with a causal relationship. In the next
section, we explore this issue more rigorously taking into
account that there are other possible drivers of these
events.
5. A Multivariate Model of Reactive Off-Cost
Events
[38] In this section of the paper, we examine the relation-
ship between the GIC proxy and the metric of challenged
reliability using the multivariate logit model specification
commonly used by researchers in making statistical infer-
ences with respect to the incidence of binary events. This
specification is similar to the probit methodology employed
by Forbes and St. Cyr [2010] in that the two methodologies
yield similar probabilities in most cases [Greene, 2008]. One
advantage of the logit specification relative to the probit is
that the transformed estimated coefficients are easier to
interpret. Specifically, the predicted value of the dependent
variable is the odds ratio, p/(1-p), where p is the probability
of the binary dependent variable being equal to one. Each
exponentiated coefficient represents the estimated change
in the odds ratio corresponding to a one-unit increase in
the corresponding predictor variable holding other vari-
ables constant. The dependent variable in the analysis is a
binary variable whose value equals one if a reactive off-cost
action by the system operator occurs in hour t and equals
zero otherwise. The explanatory variable of interest in this
case is the GIC proxy (GIC), and thus its exponentiated
Table 1. Observed Frequencies for theCategories Representing
GICs and Reactive Conditions in the PJM Power Grid, 1 April
2002–30 April 2004
On-Cost Off-Cost
GIC1 3819 298
GIC2 3905 417
GIC3 3506 483
GIC4 3305 529
Table 3. The Ratio of Observed to Expected Frequencies for
the Categories Representing GICs and Conditions in the
PJM Power Grid, 1 April 2002–30 April 2004
On-Cost Off-Cost
GIC1 1.038 0.682
GIC2 1.011 0.909
GIC3 0.983 1.140
GIC4 0.964 1.299
Table 2. Expected Frequencies Under the Assumption of
Statistical Independence for the Categories Representing
GICs and Conditions in the PJM Power Grid, 1 April
2002–30 April 2004
On-Cost Off-Cost
GIC1 3680 437
GIC2 3863 459
GIC3 3565 424
GIC4 3427 407
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coefficient represents the estimated effect of a 1-unit
increase in the GIC proxy on the odds of an off-cost event,
all other factors being held constant. To control for possibly
confounding factors, the model includes explanatory vari-
ables that are presumed to directly affect or proxy the fac-
tors that affect the probability of a reactive off-cost event.
Exclusive of ambient temperature, scheduled electricity
flows with other control areas and the level of actual load,
the control variables are largely based on the findings of
Forbes and Zampelli [2011], who present an analysis of load
forecasting errors; load-forecasting errors being just
another form of the energy imbalances examined in this
study. Their analysis presented one year of out-of-sample
evidence for the California Independent System Operator.
The analysis indicated that the root-mean squared error
of the day-ahead load forecast for the northern portion of
the control area can be reduced by about 23% if the load
forecasts are revised. Such revision would be based on
various measures of the day-ahead load forecast and
outcomes in the day-ahead electricity market. Each of
these factors is discussed below.
5.1. Ambient Temperature
[39] We hypothesize that the probability of a reactive
off-cost operation is higher, the higher the ambient
temperature (T). This is consistent with the findings of
Forbes and St. Cyr’s [2010] analysis of transformer con-
straints in PJM’s 500 kV transmission system.
5.2. Actual Load, Forecasted Load, and the Intraday
Variability in Forecasted Load
[40] We hypothesize that the probability of an off-cost
operation is higher the higher the level of both actual load
(AL) and forecasted load (FL), all other factors being held
constant. The rationale for this hypothesis is that reactive
power is consumed by transmission lines and transfor-
mers, which are more heavily utilized when load is higher.
It is further hypothesized that the probability of a reactive
off-cost operation is lower the higher the intraday vari-
ability in forecasted load as measured by the coefficient of
variation (CVFL). The rationale for this hypothesis is that
a high degree of variability in the hourly forecasted load
can be expected to favor the scheduled dispatch of more
flexible generating units relative to base load units. This
may have implications for the geographic distribution of
generation relative to load, which in turnmay have reactive
power ramifications. The skewness in the intraday fore-
casted load is also hypothesized to be a useful predictor.
Positive skewness is represented by PSFL which equals
the skewness in the hourly forecasted load for each day
when the skewness is positive. It is equal to zero other-
wise. The variable NSFL equals the absolute value of the
skewness in the hourly forecasted load for each day
corresponding to hour t when the skewness in the fore-
casted load is negative. It is equal to zero otherwise. We
hypothesize that the probability of an off-cost operation is
higher the higher the absolute value of this measure. The
rationale for this hypothesis is that insufficient levels of
reactive power may be more likely on those days when
there are several hours of unusually low levels of power
generation.
5.3. Scheduled Imports and Exports
[41] The variable SI represents scheduled net imports
during those hours in which PJM was a net importer. It is
equal to zero otherwise. We hypothesize that higher reli-
ance on imports increases the probability that a reactive
off-cost operation will be implemented. The rationale for
this hypothesis is that imports represent electricity flows
that consume reactive power without the generation that
supplies reactive power. The variable SE represents
scheduled net exports during those hours in which PJM
was a scheduled net exporter. It is equal to zero otherwise.
We hypothesize that increases in net scheduled exports
reduces the probability that PJM would implement a
reactive off-cost operation.
5.4. The Day-Ahead Electricity Price Relative
to Fuel Costs
[42] Coal and natural gas are the primary fossil fuels
used to produce electricity in PJM. The model employs the
variable DPG, defined as the ratio of the hourly day-ahead
system price of electricity relative to the price of natural
gas. The model also uses the variable DPC, which is the
hourly day-ahead system price of electricity relative to
the price of coal. Following from economic theory, we
hypothesize that these day-ahead price ratios are useful
proxies for expected operating conditions. Forbes and
Zampelli [2011] have presented evidence on this point. We
also hypothesize that the probability of an off-cost opera-
tion is higher, the higher these day-ahead price ratios.
5.5. Relative Fuel Prices
[43] Generating plants in PJM that utilize coal to produce
electricity tend to be located greater distances from
demand centers as compared to plants that produce elec-
tricity using natural gas. Under on-cost conditions, gen-
erators are dispatched based on costs which are significantly
determined by fuel prices. Thus, because reactive power
does not travel well, changes in the price of natural gas
relative to coal may have implications for the incidence of
reactive off-cost events. To account for this, the model
includes the ratio of the natural gas price relative to the coal
price (PGC) as an explanatory variable.
5.6. The Intraday Variability in the Day-Ahead Prices
[44] We hypothesize that the probability of a reactive
off-cost operation is higher, the higher the coefficient of
variation in the day-ahead hourly prices (CVDP). The
rationale for this hypothesis is that the coefficient of var-
iation in the hourly prices may be a useful predictor of
operational uncertainty.
[45] It is also hypothesized that the probability of a
reactive off-cost event is influenced by the degree of
skewness in the intraday prices. When prices are nega-
tively skewed, generators with limited flexibility in terms
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of output (e.g., nuclear) may overproduce relative to the
scheduled level during the periods of low prices to ensure
the ability to meet demand in the lucrative peak load
periods. When prices are positively skewed, the modal
price may be insufficient to justify economically full
adherence to the generation schedule. Because generation
is a source of reactive power, we hypothesize that that
odds of a shortfall in reactive power, i.e., the odds of a
reactive off-cost event, is lower (higher), the higher the
negative (positive) skewness in the hourly prices. The
degree of skewness is represented by the variables PSDP
and NSDP. PSDP equals the skewness in the hourly day-
ahead prices for each day when the skewness in the hourly
prices is positive. It is equal to zero otherwise. NSDP
equals the absolute value of the skewness in the hourly
day-ahead prices for each day when the skewness in the
hourly prices is negative. It is equal to zero otherwise.
5.7. Known Transmission Constraints
[46] Following Forbes and St. Cyr [2010], known trans-
mission constraints can be measured by the absolute value
of the difference in the day-ahead hourly prices between
PJM’s Eastern and Western hubs (DCC). We hypothesize
that the probability of an off-cost operation is higher, the
higher this day-ahead measure of congestion costs.
5.8. Other Factors
[47] Other factors can influence the probability of a
reactive off-cost event. To capture the influence of
unobserved hour-of-the-day effects, this study employs
binary variables to represent each hour of the day (Hk
where k = 2, 3, 4 … 24) exclusive of hour 1, the effect of
which is reflected in the overall constant term. Having
hour 1 be reflected in the constant term avoids the
problem of singularity in the matrix used to generate the
estimates. Unobserved hour-of-the-day effects are con-
trolled for by binary variables to represent each day of
the week (Dj where j = 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), exclusive of
Monday, the effect of which is reflected in the overall
constant term. Reflecting one of the days of the week in
the constant term avoids the problem of singularity in
the matrix used to generate the estimates.
[48] In its most general form, the model is given by:
p ¼ f ðDj;Hk;T; FL;CVFL;PSFL;NSFL; SI; SE;DPG;DPC;PGC;
CVDP;PSDP;NSDP;DCC;GICÞ; ð2Þ
where p is the probability of a reactive off-cost event.
[49] The estimation of (2) was conducted using the logit
formulation supplemented by the multivariable fractional
polynomial (MFP) modeling approach. This technique is
useful when one suspects that some or all of the relation-
ships between the dependent variable and the explanatory
variables are nonlinear [Royston and Sauerbrei, 2008] but
there is little or no basis, theoretical or otherwise, on which
to select a particular functional form. The MFP approach
begins by estimating a model that is strictly linear in the
explanatory variables. Subsequent estimations then cycle
through a battery of nonlinear transformations of the
explanatory variables (positive and negative powers, nat-
ural logarithms, etc.) until it obtains the specification that
best predicts the dependent variable. In our case, the
analysis provided support for including 11 of the explan-
atory variables with powers other than unity. The vari-
ables in question are T, FL, CVFL, NSFL, AL, SI, DPC, DPG,
PSDP, NSDP, and DCC. In the case of temperature, the
MFP suggested specification is ln(T + 15), where 15 is the
constant needed to avoid taking the logarithm of a nega-
tive value. For the variable PSDP, the specification is ln
(PSDP + 0.001), where 0.001 is a constant needed to avoid
taking the logarithm of zero. All the other MFP specifi-
cations involve the exponents 2, 0.5, and 3. For exam-
ple, the MFP specified formulations for the variable AL is
cubic.
[50] The logit/MFP estimating equation is:
Ln p= 1 p   ¼ cþ
X7
k¼2
gkDk þ ∑
24
j¼2
bjHj þ a1 lnðT þ 15Þ þ a2FL
þ a3CVFL3 þ a4PSFLþ a5NSFL3 þ a6AL3
þ a7SI0:5 þ a8SEþ a9DPC2 þ a10DPG3
þ a11PGC2 þ a12CVDP þ a13 lnðPSDP þ :001Þ
þ a14NSDP3 þ a15DCC0:5 þ dGIC: ð3Þ
The transformation on the left-hand side of (3), the logit,
takes a number that is restricted to the [0, 1] interval and
converts it into a value that has no upper or lower bound.
Consequently, even when the all the explanatory variables
have unitary exponents, the estimating equation is non-
linear, with the marginal impact of any single independent
variable contingent on the values of the others. In contrast,
under the more familiar ordinary least squares specifica-
tion the probability that the action will occur is simply a
linear function of the independent variables with no
interaction effects. It is also possible that the ordinary least
squares specification could yield a predicted probability
that is negative, a result that is obviously nonsensical
[Greene, 2008].
6. Estimation and Results
[51] There is the possibility that the effect of GICs on
the probability of a reactive off-cost event is subject to a
threshold. To assess this model specification issue,
equation (3) was estimated 101 times with an assumed
GIC threshold alternatively assumed to be 0, 1, 2, 3 …
100 nT/min. Based on the resulting values of theMcFadden
R-squared there is no evidence of a positive threshold.
Specifically, the value of the McFadden R-squared was
maximized when a threshold of zero was assumed.
[52] Table 4 presents the estimation results. The coeffi-
cient on the GIC variable indicates that the coefficient is
positive as hypothesized and is also statistically significant
at the 1% level as evidenced by its p-value of less than
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0.01. In terms of magnitude, the exponentiated estimated
coefficient indicates that holding other factors constant, a
1-unit increase in the GIC proxy increases the odds ratio
of a reactive off-cost event by 1.
[53] With respect to the other independent variables, the
coefficients on the binary variables indicate that reactive
off-cost events are less likely during periods of known peak
generation. For example, the coefficients corresponding
to the variables Friday and hour 17 are negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level as evidenced by
their p-values being less than 0.05. The signs of estimated
coefficients corresponding to Ln(T + 15), FL, AL, and CVFL3
Table 4. Estimation Results for Equation (3)
Variable Coefficient
Estimated
Coefficient
Exponentiated
Estimated
Coefficient T Statistic P-Value
Constant C 8.066 3.14E-04 11.82 <0.001
Hour 2 b2 0.107 1.113 0.36 0.721
Hour 3 b3 0.025 0.975 0.08 0.94
Hour 4 b 0.086 1.090 0.26 0.795
Hour 5 b5 0.017 1.017 0.05 0.958
Hour 6 b6 0.101 0.904 0.35 0.727
Hour 7 b7 0.483 0.617 1.77 0.076
Hour 8 b8 0.634 0.530 2.42 0.015
Hour 9 b9 0.470 0.625 1.88 0.06
Hour 10 b10 0.537 0.584 2.19 0.029
Hour 11 b11 0.509 0.601 2.12 0.034
Hour 12 b12 0.519 0.595 2.16 0.031
Hour 13 b13 0.614 0.541 2.53 0.012
Hour 14 b14 0.726 0.484 2.93 0.003
Hour 15 b15 0.750 0.472 3 0.003
Hour 16 b16 0.716 0.488 2.88 0.004
Hour 17 b17 0.611 0.543 2.47 0.013
Hour 18 b18 0.597 0.550 2.47 0.014
Hour 19 b19 0.699 0.497 2.9 0.004
Hour 20 b20 0.805 0.447 3.36 0.001
Hour 21 b21 0.822 0.439 3.39 0.001
Hour 22 b22 0.581 0.559 2.41 0.016
Hour 23 b23 0.263 0.769 1.08 0.281
Hour 24 b24 0.028 0.972 0.11 0.914
Sunday g1 0.001 1.001 0 0.997
Tuesday g2 0.373 0.688 3.37 0.001
Wednesday g3 0.249 0.780 2.3 0.021
Thursday g4 0.376 0.687 3.33 0.001
Friday g5 0.297 0.743 2.68 0.007
Saturday g6 0.161 0.851 1.04 0.298
Ln(T + 15) a1 1.611 5.009 12.71 <0.001
FL a2 2.22E-05 1.000 1.25 0.21
CVFL3 a3 307.266 0.000 9 <0.001
PSKFL a4 3.706 0.025 2.58 0.01
NSKFL3 a5 1.721 5.592 6.57 <0.001
AL3 a6 2.65E-14 1.000 7.32 <0.001
SI.5 a7 0.029 1.029 6.8 <0.001
SE a8 0.002 0.998 1.07 0.283
DPC2 a9 23.329 7.4E-11 8.69 <0.001
DPG3 a10 0.001 1.001 3.53 <0.001
PGC2 a11 13.463 1.42E-06 11.18 <0.001
CVDP a12 4.743 114.831 5.77 <0.001
PSDP3 a13 0.061 1.063 4.6 <0.001
NSDP3 a14 1.133 0.322 3.35 0.001
DCC.5 a15 0.123 1.131 5.4 <0.001
GIC d 0.018 1.019 3.4 0.001
Number of observations 16262
Number of positive observations 1727
McFadden’s R2 0.211
Percentage of correct reactive
off-cost status predictions
70
Percentage of correct reactive
on-cost status predictions
91
Log likelihood full model 4342.9228
Log likelihood intercept only 5504.570
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Table 5. A Listing of 50 Market Periods in Which the Probability of a Reactive Off-Cost Event Was Significantly Elevated by
Space Weathera
Day Month Year
Hour
(UT)
Predicted
Probability
of Off-Cost
Operations
Predicted
Incremental
GIC-Associated
Probability
of Off-Cost
Operations
Predicted
Probability
of Off-Cost
Operations in
the Absence
of Space
Weather
dH/dt
(nT/min) Comment
30 10 2003 19 0.746 0.647 0.100 178.4
29 10 2003 14 0.722 0.600 0.122 159 PJM’s solar magnetic disturbance
procedures were implemented
31 10 2003 0 0.607 0.459 0.148 118.8
31 10 2003 2 0.493 0.411 0.082 129.9
29 10 2003 18 0.437 0.340 0.097 107.5 PJM’s solar magnetic disturbance
procedures were implemented
29 10 2003 16 0.472 0.338 0.134 95.3 PJM’s solar magnetic disturbance
procedures were implemented
29 10 2003 17 0.455 0.338 0.117 99.9 PJM’s solar magnetic disturbance
procedures were implemented
30 10 2003 21 0.465 0.295 0.170 78.6
30 10 2003 22 0.522 0.291 0.231 70.2
30 10 2003 20 0.339 0.247 0.092 88.4
30 10 2003 23 0.416 0.245 0.171 67.4
31 10 2003 12 0.304 0.232 0.072 93.7
30 10 2003 1 0.308 0.212 0.096 77.7
29 10 2003 15 0.327 0.189 0.138 60.3
29 10 2003 13 0.280 0.156 0.123 55.2
30 10 2003 0 0.282 0.153 0.128 53.2
29 10 2003 19 0.238 0.152 0.086 65.4
24 10 2003 22 0.337 0.148 0.189 42.4
29 10 2003 12 0.233 0.139 0.093 58.7
29 10 2003 21 0.268 0.137 0.131 48.3
23 5 2002 15 0.196 0.126 0.070 64.1
1 8 2002 23 0.838 0.123 0.715 39.4
29 10 2003 20 0.196 0.119 0.078 58
18 8 2002 18 0.902 0.105 0.796 46.4
24 10 2003 15 0.288 0.102 0.187 30.9
29 5 2003 19 0.156 0.099 0.057 60.6
24 10 2003 21 0.263 0.094 0.168 30.7
17 4 2002 16 0.718 0.093 0.625 23.1
17 4 2002 15 0.630 0.091 0.539 20.5
31 10 2003 11 0.154 0.087 0.067 50.9
29 10 2003 22 0.288 0.087 0.201 25.7
31 10 2003 13 0.177 0.083 0.094 39.8
17 4 2002 18 0.809 0.083 0.727 25.4
15 7 2002 20 0.418 0.082 0.336 19.1
17 7 2002 16 0.338 0.082 0.256 21.4
31 10 2003 1 0.159 0.069 0.090 35.4
22 1 2004 1 0.177 0.069 0.109 30.9
30 5 2003 20 0.211 0.068 0.143 25.6
30 10 2003 18 0.180 0.065 0.115 28.5
29 10 2003 11 0.132 0.064 0.068 39.8
30 10 2003 16 0.191 0.061 0.129 25.1
29 5 2003 22 0.103 0.061 0.042 52.5
20 11 2003 13 0.108 0.061 0.047 48.6
23 5 2002 16 0.129 0.060 0.069 37.8
29 5 2003 20 0.117 0.056 0.061 38.6
29 10 2003 6 0.067 0.056 0.011 99.3
29 8 2003 20 0.695 0.055 0.639 13.6
9 9 2003 20 0.207 0.055 0.152 20.4
29 10 2003 23 0.238 0.054 0.184 17.7
22 1 2004 13 0.228 0.054 0.175 18.3
aBecause of independent rounding, the predicted probability in the seventh column plus the predicted incremental probability do not add up
to equal the predicted probability in the fifth column.
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are consistent with expectations. Except for FL, these coef-
ficients are also statistically significant as evidenced by their
p-values. As hypothesized, the coefficients corresponding to
PSFL3 and NSFL3 are negative and positive, respectively.
Both coefficients are statistically significant. Also as
hypothesized, the coefficients on the variables SI and SE are
positive and negative, respectively. However, of the two
coefficients, only the coefficient on SI is statistically signifi-
cant. The coefficients corresponding toDPC2 andDPG3 are
statistically significant and the estimated marginal impacts
Table 6. A Listing of 50 Market Periods in Which the Probability of a Reactive Off-Cost Event Was Not Significantly Elevated by
Space Weathera
Day Month Year
Hour
(UT)
Predicted
Probability
of Off-Cost
Operations
Predicted
Incremental
GIC-Associated
Probability
of Off-Cost
Operations
Predicted
Probability of
Off-Cost Operations
in the Absence
of Space Weather
dH/dt
(nT/min)
30 7 2002 20 0.9999 7.57E-06 0.9998 2.8
30 7 2002 19 0.9998 7.33E-06 0.9998 2.3
30 7 2002 18 0.9997 1.01E-05 0.9997 2
14 8 2002 19 0.9996 9.60E-06 0.9996 1.4
30 7 2002 21 0.9996 2.03E-05 0.9996 2.6
5 8 2002 20 0.9996 1.13E-05 0.9996 1.4
14 8 2002 20 0.9981 5.03E-05 0.9980 1.4
5 8 2002 19 0.9977 3.87E-05 0.9976 0.9
30 7 2002 17 0.9976 2.17E-04 0.9974 4.7
5 8 2002 21 0.9972 1.14E-04 0.9971 2.2
31 7 2002 20 0.9970 5.03E-05 0.9969 0.9
31 7 2002 19 0.9957 6.39E-05 0.9956 0.8
15 8 2002 19 0.9955 6.03E-04 0.9949 6.8
15 8 2002 20 0.9950 9.24E-04 0.9940 9.2
14 8 2002 18 0.9946 1.30E-04 0.9945 1.3
14 8 2002 21 0.9946 4.02E-04 0.9942 3.9
15 8 2002 18 0.9920 3.41E-03 0.9886 19.4
5 8 2002 18 0.9880 3.98E-04 0.9876 1.8
15 8 2002 17 0.9852 5.45E-04 0.9847 2
16 8 2002 20 0.9847 4.80E-04 0.9842 1.7
16 8 2002 19 0.9842 3.18E-04 0.9839 1.1
15 8 2002 21 0.9840 1.83E-03 0.9822 6
1 8 2002 20 0.9827 1.74E-03 0.9809 5.3
13 8 2002 20 0.9826 3.81E-04 0.9822 1.2
14 8 2002 17 0.9822 5.54E-04 0.9817 1.7
2 8 2002 19 0.9804 2.95E-03 0.9775 7.8
1 8 2002 19 0.9779 1.31E-03 0.9766 3.2
2 8 2002 20 0.9774 2.39E-03 0.9750 5.6
30 7 2002 22 0.9770 3.33E-04 0.9767 0.8
5 8 2002 17 0.9759 5.25E-04 0.9754 1.2
16 8 2002 18 0.9733 5.30E-04 0.9728 1.1
31 7 2002 21 0.9715 4.11E-04 0.9711 0.8
1 8 2002 21 0.9710 5.60E-03 0.9654 9.9
29 7 2002 21 0.9706 8.52E-04 0.9697 1.6
13 8 2002 21 0.9701 6.48E-04 0.9694 1.2
16 8 2002 21 0.9699 7.61E-04 0.9692 1.4
29 7 2002 20 0.9699 8.71E-04 0.9690 1.6
30 7 2002 16 0.9697 1.10E-03 0.9686 2
16 8 2002 17 0.9684 5.68E-04 0.9679 1
13 8 2002 19 0.9680 8.08E-04 0.9672 1.4
2 8 2002 18 0.9660 2.31E-03 0.9637 3.7
31 7 2002 18 0.9600 7.12E-04 0.9593 1
19 8 2002 20 0.9591 4.79E-03 0.9543 6.3
1 8 2002 18 0.9573 8.89E-03 0.9485 10.8
26 6 2002 20 0.9572 5.31E-04 0.9567 0.7
14 8 2002 22 0.9557 1.74E-03 0.9540 2.2
26 6 2002 19 0.9547 6.41E-04 0.9541 0.8
3 7 2002 19 0.9510 1.65E-03 0.9494 1.9
15 8 2002 22 0.9461 2.59E-03 0.9435 2.7
2 8 2002 21 0.9429 9.93E-03 0.9330 9.3
aBecause of independent rounding, the predicted probability in the seventh column plus the predicted incremental probability do not add up
to equal the predicted probability in the fifth column.
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are consistent with expectations when the values of the
exponents are considered. The estimatedmarginal impact of
PGC2 is also consistent with expectations, and the coeffi-
cient is highly statistically as evidenced by its p-value.
[54] With respect to the model’s explanatory power, note
that it is not possible to calculate a conventional R-squared
that is meaningful because the dependent variable is
binary while the predicted values are probabilities. A
number of alternative scalar fit measures have been
introduced. According to Greene [2002, E15–28], these
measures “… share the flaw that none satisfactorily mimic
the true measure of the proportion of variation explained
given by R2 in the linear regression context.”
[55] McFadden’s R-squared is one of the more com-
monly reported measures of scalar fit when the dependent
variable is binary. Its value here is 0.211. This value indi-
cates that the log likelihood function, the objective func-
tion whose maximization yields the estimated parameters,
improves by about 21% compared to when the model is
estimated with only a constant term as an explanatory
variable. The percentage of correct predictions is a more
meaningful measure of the scalar fit. Using 0.5 as the
threshold for a prediction of a reactive off-cost event, the
percentage of correct predictions when on-cost status is
predicted equals 91%, while the percentage of correct
predictions when off-cost status is predicted equals 70%.
The latter percentage is approximately 90% when the
predicted probability is greater than 0.80.
[56] The econometric results presented in Table 4 should
not be taken as definitive proof that GICs contribute to
challenged reliability. Statistical methods alone cannot
render results that establish or reject causality between
two variables that are contemporaneously correlated. For
this reason, ad hoc approaches to address the issue of
causality are methodologically unsound. Instead, the results
of inferential statistical analyses indicate whether the data
are consistent with the hypothesis under consideration.
[57] There are three logical explanations for the results
presented in Table 4. First, consistent with Molinski
[2002], Kappenman [2003], and PJM’s implementation of
its solar magnetic disturbance procedures, GICs contribute
to adverse reactive power conditions as hypothesized.
Second, there is reverse causation, i.e., adverse reactive
power conditions cause the GICs. Third, GICs do not con-
tribute to adverse reactive power conditions; instead an
omitted variable that is highly correlated with GICs is the
true cause. The second possibility does not appear likely
given that solar activity and the resulting properly mea-
sured GIC proxy are truly exogenous variables. With
respect to the third possibility, we have yet to learn of an
excluded terrestrial variable that contributes to adverse
reactive power conditions and is also highly correlated
with GICs. We suspect that others would be equally
challenged in this regard. In short, the results pre-
sented here would not be easily dismissed by anyone with
knowledge of the effects of GICs on reactive power con-
sumption and formal training in multivariate inferential
statistics. Others are free to adopt their own criteria. For
example, some may consider our results acceptable only
if the relationship is visually apparent using a scatter
diagram or graph. Yet many important relationships do
not meet this “visually apparent” criterion, e.g., smoking
and lung cancer, a relationship that was established in
large part using inferential statistics [Parascandola et al.,
2006]. While a scatter diagram can illuminate a relation-
ship between the variables X and Ywhen the Y is a function
of only X, it can fail miserably when Y is a function of more
than one variable.
[58] Table 5 presents a listing of 50 market periods in
which the predicted probability of a reactive off-cost event
was significantly elevated by space weather. This listing
reports the predicted probability based on terrestrial con-
siderations along with the predicted probability based on
terrestrial plus space weather considerations. Depending
on geomagnetic conditions, the difference in the two pre-
dicted probabilities can be significant. For example, based
on terrestrial conditions only, the predicted probability of
a reactive off-cost event in hour 14 of 29 October 2003
equals 0.122; when the impact of geomagnetic conditions
is factored in, the predicted probability is 0.722. It may be
worth noting that PJM’s solar magnetic disturbance pro-
cedures were implemented during this market period.
For these 50 h, the median predicted probability of an
off-cost event (0.2849) is more than double the predicted
probability when only terrestrial determinants of the events
are considered (0.1259). To put the results in perspective,
Table 7. System Conditions, the GIC Proxy, and the Predicted Probability of a Reactive Off-Cost Event
Vulnerability
Percentile in the
Absence of
Space Weather
Probability of an
Off-Cost Event in
the Absence of
Space Weather
Value of the GIC Proxy
(in nT/min) That Would
Increase the Probability
of Reactive Off-Cost
Event to 0.51
Value of the GIC Proxy
(in nT/min) That Would
Increase the Probability
of a Reactive
Off-Cost Event to 0.75
Value of the
GIC Proxy (in nT/min)
That Would Increase
the Probability
of a Reactive
Off-Cost Event to 0.95
5th 0.0055 284 342 445
10th 0.0108 248 305 408
25th 0.0279 195 253 355
50 th 0.0643 148 205 308
75 th 0.1215 110 167 270
90 th 0.2110 74 131 234
95 th 0.3318 40 98 200
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Table 6 presents a listing of 50 market periods in which the
predicted probability of a reactive off-cost event was not
significantly elevated by space weather.
[59] Table 7 presents the results of an analysis of the
predicted probabilities. The predicted probabilities in the
absence of the GIC proxy were first calculated and sorted.
At the fifth percentile of the predicted probabilities, the
terrestrial-based probability of a reactive off-cost event is
0.0055, while at the 95th percentile the probability equals
0.3318. Table 7 then reports the value of the GIC proxy that
would be needed to increase the predicted probability to
0.51, 0.75, and 0.95. At the 5th percentile of the terrestrial-
based probabilities (column two), the GIC proxy would
need to equal 284, 342, and 445 nT/min. for the predicted
probability of a reactive off-cost event to rise to 0.51, 0.75,
and 0.95, respectively. In contrast, at the 95th percentile of
the terrestrial-based probabilities the GIC proxy would
only need to equal 40, 98, and 200 nT/min. for the pre-
dicted probability of an off-cost event to rise to 0.51, 0.75,
and 0.95, respectively.
7. Conclusion
[60] This paper has addressed whether geomagnetic
activity was a challenge to power system reliability during
solar cycle 23 for the PJM regional transmission organiza-
tion in North America. We examined the relationship
between a GIC proxy and a metric of challenged reliability
using the logit statistical methodwith statistical controls for
expected system conditions. The results indicate that while
there is no evidence of a space weather induced blackout
in PJM during solar cycle 23, PJM’s operations were nev-
ertheless challenged by geomagnetic activity. The findings
are consistent with previous literature. The results are also
consistent with PJM’s implementation of its solar mag-
netic disturbance procedures during the Bastille Day storm
in July 2000 as well as during the Halloween Storms in
October 2003.
[61] The analysis contained in this paper also indicates
that the GIC/reactive power vulnerability of the power
system is contingent on system conditions at the time of
the geomagnetic storm. A storm would truly need to be a
super storm to induce a reactive off-cost event when the
terrestrial-based vulnerability of the system is low. In
contrast, our results indicated that a modest geomagnetic
storm could easily give rise to a reliability challenge when
the terrestrial-based vulnerability of the system is high.
This finding may have implications for mitigating the
overall electric power reliability challenge. While space
weather forecasting is in its infancy, the results of this
analysis suggest that it is possible to forecast the terrestrial-
based vulnerability of the power system. Inspection of
Table 6 suggests that such forecasts may have the potential
to enhance reliability even when the role of space weather
is minor. These forecasts may also have the potential to
better inform system operators about the space weather
vulnerability of their systems, which would position them
to make better use of space weather forecasts.
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